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Randomized controlled trials have been sporadically used in economic research  since the 
negative income tax experiments between 1968 and 1980, see Wise and Hausman (1985), and 
have been regularly used since then to evaluate labor market and welfare programs, Manski 
and Garfinkel (1992), Gueron and Rolston (2013). In recent years, they have spread widely in 
economics (and in other social sciences), perhaps most prominently in development and health 
economics. The “credibility revolution” in econometrics, Angrist and Pischke (2010), putatively 
frees empirical investigation from implausible and arbitrary theoretical and statistical 
assumptions and RCTs are seen as the most “credible” and “rigorous” of the credible methods; 
indeed credible non-RCT designs typically pattern themselves as closely as possible on RCTs. 
Imbens (2010) writes “Randomized experiments do occupy a special place in the hierarchy of 
evidence, namely at the very top.”  
In medicine, Pocock and Elbourne (2000) argue that only RCTs “can provide a reliably 
unbiased estimate of treatment effects,” and without such estimates, they “see considerable 
dangers to clinical research and even to the well-being of patients.” The link between bias and 
risk to patients is taken as obvious, with no attempt to show that an RCT experimental design 
does indeed minimizes the expected harm to patients. The World Bank has run many 
development related RCTs, and makes claims well beyond unbiasedness. Its implementation 
manual, Gertler et al (2011) states “we can be very confident that our estimated average 
impact” (given as the difference in means between the treatment and control group) 
  
“constitute the true impact of the program, since by construction we have eliminated all 
observed and unobserved factors that might otherwise plausibly explain the differences in 
outcomes.” High quality evidence indeed; the truth is surely the ultimate in credibility. 
In Deaton and Cartwright (2016), we argue that some of the popularity of RCTs, among 
the public as well as some practitioners, rests on misunderstandings about what they are 
capable of accomplishing. Well-conducted RCTs could provide unbiased estimates of the 
average treatment effect (ATE) in the study population, provided no relevant differences 
between treatment and control are introduced post randomisation, which blinding of subjects, 
investigators, data collectors, and analysts serves to diminish. Unbiasedness says that, if we 
were to repeat the trial many times, we would be right on average. Yet we are almost never in 
such a situation, and with only one trial, as is virtually always the case, unbiasedness does 
nothing to prevent our single estimate from being very far away from the truth. If, as if often 
believed, randomization were to guarantee that the treatment and control groups are identical 
except for the treatment, then indeed, we would have a precise—indeed exact—estimate of 
the ATE. But randomization does nothing of the kind, even at baseline; in any given RCT, 
nothing ensures that other causal factors are balanced across the groups at the point of 
randomization. Investigators often test for balance on observable covariates, but unless the 
randomization device is faulty, or people systematically break their assignment, the null 
hypothesis underlying the test is true by construction, so that the test is not informative, and 
should not be carried out.  
 Of course, we know that the ATE from an RCT is only an estimate, not the infallible 
truth, and like other estimates, it has a standard error. If appropriately computed, the standard 
  
error of the estimated ATE can give an indication of the importance of other factors. As was 
understood by Fisher from the very first agricultural trials, randomization, while doing nothing 
to guarantee balance on omitted factors, gives us a method for assessing their importance. Yet 
even here there are pitfalls. The tstatistics for estimated ATEs from RCTs do not in general 
follow the tdistribution. As recently documented by Young (2016), a large fraction of 
published studies have made spurious inferences because of this Fisher-Behrens problem, or 
because of the failure to deal appropriately with multiple-hypothesis testing. Although most of 
the published literature is problematic, these issues can be addressed by improvements in 
technique. Not so however, in cases where individual treatment effects are skewed—as in 
healthcare experiments, where a one or two individuals can account for a large share of 
spending (this was true in the Rand Health Experiment), or in microfinance, where a few 
subjects make money and most do not—where the tdistribution again breaks down. Once 
again, inferences are likely to be wrong, but here there is no clear fix. When there are outlying 
individual treatment effects, the estimate depends on whether the outliers are assigned to 
treatments or controls, causing massive reductions in the effective sample size. Trimming of 
outliers would fix the statistical problem, but only at the price of destroying the economic 
problem; for example, in healthcare, it is precisely the few outliers that make or break a 
program. In view of these difficulties, we suspect that a large fraction of the published results of 
RCTs in development and health economics are unreliable.  
The “credibility” of RCTs comes from their ability to get answers without the use of 
potentially contentious prior information about structure, such as specifying other causal 
factors, or detailing the mechanisms through which they operate. A skeptical lay audience is 
  
often unwilling to accept prior economic knowledge and even within the profession, there are 
differences about appropriate assumptions or controls. Yet, as is always the case, the only 
route to precision is through prior information, and controlling for factors that are likely to be 
important, just as in a (non-randomized) laboratory experiment in physics, biology, or even 
economics, scientists seek accurate measurement by controlling for known confounders. 
Cumulative science happens when new results are built on top of old ones—or undermine 
them—and RCTs, with their refusal to use prior science, make this very difficult. And any RCT 
can be challenged ex post by examining the differences between treatments and controls as 
actually allocated, and showing that arguably important factors were unevenly distributed; 
prior information is excluded by randomization, but reappears in the interpretation of the 
results.  
A well-conducted RCT can yield a credible estimate of an ATE in one specific population, 
namely the “study population” from which the treatments and controls were selected.  
Sometimes this is enough; if we are doing a post hoc program evaluation, if we are testing a 
hypothesis that is supposed to be generally true, if we want to demonstrate that the treatment 
can work somewhere, or if the study population is a randomly drawn sample from the 
population of interest whose ATE we are trying to measure. Yet the study population is often 
not the population that we are interested in, especially if subjects must volunteer to be in the 
experiment and have their own reasons for participating or not. A famous early example comes 
from Ashenfelter (1981), who found that people who volunteer for a training program tend to 
have seen a recent drop in their wages; similarly, people who take a drug may be those who 
have failed other forms of therapy. Indeed, many of the differences in results between 
  
experimental and non-experimental studies can be traced, not to differences in methodology, 
but to differences in the populations to which they apply.  
More generally, demonstrating that a treatment works in one situation is exceedingly 
weak evidence that it will work in the same way elsewhere; this is the “transportation” 
problem: what does it take to allow us to use the results in new contexts, whether policy 
contexts or in the development of theory? It can only be addressed by using previous 
knowledge and understanding; i.e. by interpreting the RCT within some structure, the structure 
that, somewhat paradoxically, the RCT gets its credibility from refusing to use. If we want to go 
from an RCT to policy, we need to build a bridge from the RCT to the policy; no matter how 
rigorous or careful the RCT, if the bridge is built by a hand-waving simile that the policy context 
is somehow similar to the experimental context, the rigor in the trial does nothing to support a 
policy; in any chain of evidence, it is the weakest link that determines the overall strength of 
the claim, not the strongest. Using the results of an RCT cannot simply be a matter of simple 
extrapolation from the experiment to another context. Causal effects depend on the settings in 
which they are derived, and often depend on factors that might be constant within the 
experimental setting but different elsewhere. Even the direction of causality can depend on the 
context. We have a better chance of transporting results if we recognize the issue when 
designing the experiment—which itself requires the commitment to some kind of structure—
and try to investigate the effects of the factors that are likely to vary elsewhere. Without a 
structure, without an understanding of why the effects work, we not only cannot transport, but 
we cannot begin to do welfare economics; just because an intervention works, and because the 
investigator thinks the intervention makes people better off, is no guarantee that it actually 
  
does so. Without knowing why things happen and why people do things, we run the risk of 
worthless casual (fairy story) causal theorizing, and we have given up on one of the central 
tasks of economics. 
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